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I. INTRODUCTION
Architectural works, as expressed and embodied in buildings, ar-
chitectural plans and drawings, stand protected as subject matter of
copyright, effective December 1, 1990. On that date, President Bush
signed legislation' that created a new category of protectable subject
matter for architectural works.2 The new law, entitled the Architec-
* This Comment received first prize in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition
in copyright law at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln College of Law. The
competition is sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers.
1. The enacted legislation which contained the added protection for architectural
works is the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089 (1990) [hereinafter Judicial Improvements Act].
2. Archictectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 7, 104
Stat. 5133 (1990). The legislation began as H.R. 5498, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990),
which was introduced by Congressman Robert W. Katsenmeier, who chaired the
House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of
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tural Works Copyright Protection Act,3 effects changes that were de-
termined necessary to fulfill requirements of the Berne Convention,
to which the United States became a signatory on March 1, 1989.4
In response to Congressional inquiry, the Register of Copyrights
reported that architectural blueprints and models and artistic features
separable from the overall shape of three-dimensional works were ad-
equately protected by United States copyright law. On the other
hand, the Register said, the adequacy of protection of "works of archi-
tecture" (i.e., buildings) remained in doubt.5 Since Article 2(1) of the
Berne Convention included "works of architecture," the Register sug-
gested that United States law might not fully comply with the
convention.6
The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (Architectural
Works Act) implements one of the four solutions suggested by the
Register of Copyrights to bring the United States law in compliance
with the Berne Convention.7 The implemented solution recom-
mended that Congress "[c]reate a new subject matter category for
works of architecture in the Copyright Act and legislate appropriate
limitations."8
This Comment will examine the Architectural Works Act's
changes and additions to current copyright law. The changes and ad-
Justice. Mr. Katsenmeier's career in Congress spanned 32 years during which he
was aggressively involved in intellectual property law. His career came to a close
after Mr. Katsenmeier was defeated in November, 1990, in a bid for re-election.
3. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 7, 104
Stat. 5133 § 701 (1990).
4. THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, Copyright in Works of Architecture, 221 (June 19,
1989) [hereinafter Copyright Report].
5. Id. at 221-22.
6. Id, at 221. Similar uncertainty led to exclusion of works of architecture from
protection under the Berne Implementation Act of 1988. In developing the Im-
plementation Act, Congress adopted a "minimalist approach" and, for the most
part, made only changes necessary to join the convention. Professor Paul Gold-
stein and former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer testified to a House sub-
committee that United States' adherence to the convention might not require
express legislative protection for works of architecture. Based on the uncertainty
about whether the legislation needed to include additional protection of works of
architecture, Congress decided not to include express protection. Instead, Con-
gress requested the Register of Copyrights to conduct a study. The study is not
reflected in the Copyright Report.
7. Id. at 223.
8. I& The three other suggested solutions were: (a) "[a]mend the Copyright Act to
give the copyright owner of architectural plans the right to prohibit unauthorized
construction of substantially similar buildings based on those plans;"
(b) "[a]mend the definition of 'useful article' in the Copyright Act to exclude
unique architectural structures;" and (c) "[d]o nothing and allow the courts to
develop new legal theories of protection under existing federal statutory and case
law, as they attempt to come to grips with U.S. adherence to the Berne Conven-
tion and allow the various state court rememdies to develop." Id. at 224-25.
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ditions studied will include both those explicitly made by the Act and
those likely to be created by judicial enforcement and interpretation
of the Act. Regarding each addition, change and modification, this
Comment will address some of the problems and issues likely to arise.
In the course of this analysis, this Comment will propose solutions to
the problems and issues likely to arise.
II. ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIONS
The Architectural Works Act amends the Copyright Act's defini-
tions section, section 101, by including the definition of an "architec-
tural work."9
An "architectural work" is the design of a building as embodied in any tangi-
ble medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or draw-
ings. The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and
composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individ-
ual standard features.1 0
"What is a building?" is perhaps the first question that comes to
mind upon reading the new definitional section. 1 The House Judici-
ary Committee, anticipating this preliminary inquiry, urged that the
term "building" includes habitable structures like residences and of-
fice buildings and also covers structures that are used by people, but
not inhabited, such as churches, gazebos and pergolas.12
Before the legislation reached the committee, the Subcommittee
on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice
amended the definition of architectural works by deleting the term
"three-dimensional structure" which supplemented "building."13 The
Subcommittee feared interpretation of "three-dimensional structures"
might include works like highway bridges, canals, dams and side-
walks, and it determined that copyright protection of such works-
some forming important elements of the nation's transit system-was
not needed to stimulate creativity or prohibit unauthorized
reproduction. 14
Between the works intended to be included-houses and gazebos-
9. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 7, 104
Stat. 5133 § 702(a)(1990). Title 7, § 702(a). Section 703 of title 7 creates the new
subject matter category and amends section 102(a) of title 17, United States Code.
10. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 7, 104
Stat. 5133 § 702(a)(1990).
11. Goldberg & Bernstein, Legislation by the 101st Congress, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 1991,
at 3.
12. H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1990).
13. I1& The phrase "three-dimensional structures" was included in H.R. 3990, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), the predecessor of H.R. 5498, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990),
and in the version of H.R. 5498 that reached the subcommittee. Protection for
nonhabitable three-dimensional structures was not required by the Berne
Convention.
14. H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1990).
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and those not intended to be included-bridges and dams-exist a
number of structures that may or may not be "buildings." Questions
remain as to whether such works as swimming pools, ponds,15 parking
garages, bandshells, barns, grain silos, walls' 6 high tombs,' 7 windmills
and paddlewheels' 8 are "buildings" for copyright purposes.
A "building" is defined by one architectural dictionary as "a struc-
ture of some elaboration, especially, in architectural usage, a dwelling
house, hall for meeting, place of worship, or the like."19 "Building"
differs from "architecture" in its exclusion of "all idea of artistic treat-
ment .... [A building] may be commonplace, ugly, insufficient, or
otherwise of small importance." 20
As defined, while the term "building" particularly encompasses
works like houses and churches, it also covers structures of lesser
elaboration and detailed planning. A legal definition for copyright
purposes of the word "building" should include all three-dimensional
structures that are fixed at a certain site. Perhaps the Judiciary Com-
mittee is correct in excluding important elements of the nation's
transportation system, like highway bridges and canals. Certainly, the
public safety demands state of the art planning and engineering of
roads and travelled waterways. But the public transportation excep-
tion to the category of architectural works defined as "buildings"
should be narrowly construed. Outside the exception, all three-
dimensional products of architectural planning should fit the "build-
ing" definition.
Another preliminary question that deceptively may appear simple
is who will be the copyright owner of architectural works. Will it be
the architect, her firm or the party commissioning her, or will it be the
builder of the work? In countries where architectural works are pro-
tected, generally the architect, who created the plans, is considered
the author of both the plans and the structure.2 ' The builder of the
work, on the other hand, is viewed as part of the process of producing
the structure.2 2 In those countries, the party commissioning the work,
however, may stand a better chance of being deemed the author under
15. Note, Copyright Protection for Architecture and the Berne Convention, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 403, 419 (1990)(authored by Natalie Wargo)[hereinafter Wargo](citing
Vincent v. Universal Hous. Co., 1928 MacG. Cop. Cas. 275 (U.K.)).
16. I&
17. 3 R. STURGIS', ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF ARCHITECTURE AND BUILDING 816
(Unabridged Reprinting of the 1901-02 ed. 1989) [hereinafter STURGIS' ILLUs-
TRATED]("High Tomb. One raised from the floor instead of being a mere slab in-
laid in the pavement.")
18. Wargo, supra note 15, at 421 n.96 (citing 6 Eur. COM. CAs. 59, 66 (1983)).
19. 1 STURGIS' ILLUSTRATED, supra note 17, at 384.
20. Id
21. Wargo, supra note 15, at 423.
22. I& at 424.
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concepts resembling "work for hire."23 An international committee,
evaluating the appropriate protection of architectural works, sug-
gested that the architect must be considered the author.2 4 Current
United States law generally comports with the notion that the party
commissioning the works is not the author or initial copyright owner
of the work.25 Instead, either the architect or her firm is considered
the work's author.26 This thinking undoubtedly would extend the ar-
chitect's or firm's authorship to the actual building. Any other place-
ment of authorship of the building would defeat the intent behind the
Architectural Works Act.27 In sum, the Architectural Works Act
should extend the protection provided by traditional United States
copyright law to the architect or architectural firm as the author of
and initial owner of copyright in architectural plans, drawings, models
and the building.
Beyond these preliminary issues, the new definition of "architec-,
tural works" has two components.28 First, it sets forth that the "de-
sign of a building" is what is to be protected. The term "design"-
which is the work being protected-includes "the overall form as well
23. Id.
24. Id. at 441 (citing Oeuvres d'architecture: Document Pr~paratoire pour le Comit6
d'experts gouvernementaux OMPI/Unesco et rapport de ce Comit6, 99 D.A. 363,
364 (1985)).
25. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); see also
Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252,257-
58 (D. Neb. 1982)(The Aitken court decided that, where the company employed to
construct an apartment complex did not have the right to exercise control over
the architectural firm, the firm was independent contractor and not an employee
of the company and thus ownership of copyright vested in the architectural firm.)
The client is unlikely to be considered a joint or sole author unless it actively
and substantially participates in the creation of the designs. Additionally, to
avoid risking that the party commissioning the architect might enjoy authorship
rights under a work for hire theory, many architects prior to the CCNV decision
included in their contracts a clause explicitly stating that the plans will remain
the architect's property. See Joseph J. Legat Architects v. United States, 625 F.
Supp. 293 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981)(archi-
tectural firm, not homeowner, ruled the author).
Similarly, a provision retaining for the architect copyright in the plans and
final structure could also be included in the contract.
26. See Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 258-
59 (D. Neb. 1982).
27. It is "architecture" that is frequently referred to in H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess 20 (1990) as deserving the protection of copyright, not building or
constructing, and clearly not the commissioning of architecture. For example:
"Architecture is a form of artistic expression that performs a significant societal
purpose... " H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1990).
The Architectural Works Act puts teeth into the protection of the rights of
architects by extending protection to the finished structure. Architects, not
builders or land owners, now will have more incentive to create plans, knowing
the design will be protected even after the building is constructed.
28. H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 18.
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as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the de-
sign."29 The "overall form" should simply be construed to mean the
overall appearance of the building.30 The "arrangement and composi-
tion of spaces and elements" should include things like dimensions
and configuration and location of rooms, doors, windows and closets.31
Protection should cover both the interior and exterior of the work.32
While individual and nonoriginal elements, such as skylights, bed-
rooms, atriums, domes and basic shapes, should remain unprotected,33
the elements may, by original configuration and coordination, form a
protectable whole.34
Even original design elements should not be protected as architec-
tural works.35 Instead, they should be treated as "pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works,"36 which will undoubtedly be subjected to a sep-
arability test as useful articles.3 7 Clearly, under such a test, original
designs of gargoyles, stained glass windows, bas-relief bronze doors,
and similar works would be protectable. 38 Elements that do not pass
29. Archictectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 7, 104
Stat. 5133 (1990). See also Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106,
1109 (9th Cir. 1970).
30. Shipley, Copyright Protection for Architectural Works, 37 S.C.L. REV. 393, 428
(1986)[hereinafter Shipley].
31. Id. at 428, 435.
32. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 18.
33. Shipley, supra note 30, at 445.
34. Id See also H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 18.
35. See Note, Innovation and Imitation: Artistic Advance and the Legal Protection
of Architectural Works, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 81, 96 (1984)(authored by Elizabeth
A. Brainard)[hereinafter Brainard]. Brainard writes:
Prohibiting the copying of an entire design from a completed structure
protects an architect's future economic interest in a design while elimi-
nating only the mindless copying that thwarts rather than promotes ar-
tistic progress. A completed structure, however, also presents the fullest
opportunity for other architects to examine and analyze a design and to
engage in carefully considered borrowing of discrete design elements.
Therefore, to best serve progress in architectural design, wholesale copy-
ing of completed structures should be prohibited, but protection should
not preclude the selective borrowing of design elements within a com-
pleted structure.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5)(1989).
37. See Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145-46 (2d Cir.
1987). See also Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Ap-
proach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741 (1983).
38. Shipley, supra note 30, at 427 n.184 and accompanying text. Professor Shipley
avers that "such works (i.e., gargoyles, stained glass windows and bas-relief
bronze doors) should be treated as features added to a structure, which are capa-
ble of existing separately from the building's utilitarian purpose."
Shipley made this point to explain how buildings sufficiently embellished
with separable ornate carvings and decorating could be protectable, while simple,
Bauhaus-style buildings could not. Shipley objected to this distinction when
made for the purpose of determining whether to protect a building.
The point here is that gargoyles, stained glass windows and the like may very
[Vol. 70:873
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the separability test, on the other hand, would not be protectable.
Second, the definition states that the protected design may be "em-
bodied in any tangible medium of expression." The definition speci-
fies certain approved media as the "building" itself, "architectural
plans," and "drawings." Other media undoubtedly qualifying for pro-
tection are models, elevations, blueprints and renderings of architec-
tural works, and computer data and programs for designing and three-
dimensional drafting.3 9
The above specification of architectural plans and drawings oddly
makes the media protected under two subject matter definitions-as
"architectural works" and, as two-dimensional works under the "pic-
torial, graphic, and sculptural works category." The Judiciary Com-
mittee said this double protection was intentional.40 "An individual
creating an architectural work by depicting that work in plans or
drawing will have two separate copyrights.... Either or both of these
copyrights may be infringed and eligible separately for damages." 41
The Committee added that courts or juries may reduce a damages
award to avoid double recovery.42 Other questions that may arise with
respect to the double protection will be addressed below in Part
VIII.43
III. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW SUBJECT MATTER
Creation of the new category of copyright subject matter takes "ar-
chitectural works" out of the category of pictorial, graphic and sculp-
tural works. Therefore, the useful articles restriction, which applies
to pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, and the confounding separa-
bility test will no longer apply to architectural works.44
well be separable from the building-perhaps both conceptually and physically.
If, standing by itself, the element meets the separability test, then it may be pro-
tected as a pictorial, graphic or sculptural works.
39. See H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 19. See also Letter from G. William
Quatman and Mark E. Brown to the Office of Register of Copyrights (Sept. 16,
1988), at 1-2 [hereinafter Quatman Letter](responding to Notice of Inquiry, 53
Fed. Reg. 21,536 (1988)[hereinafter Notice of Inquiry], reprinted in Copyright Re-
port, supra note 4, at app. B.), reprinted in Copyright Report, supra note 4, at app.
C.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5)(1989).
41. H. R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 19.
42. Id
43. See infr notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
44. See H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 20. See also Note, The Effect of the Berne
Implementation Act of 1988 on Copyright Protection for Architectural Struc-
tures, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 173 (1990)(authored by Dawn M. Lar-
sen)[hereinafter Larsen].
Architectural works no longer fall under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) as pictorial,




Although architectural works are no longer subject to separability
scrutiny, the question remains as to how to determine their copyright-
ability. Many commentators endorse application of the basic original-
ity test to architectural works and point to the law of other countries
to show that such a standard has not resulted in absurd overinclusive-
ness.45 Some other countries, however, impose a higher standard of
originality because of the useful and technical nature of architectural
works.46
The Judiciary Committee suggested a two-step analysis to evaluate
the copyrightability of architectural works. The first step calls for the
determination of whether the work is "original."47 After this basic-
non-heightened--originality test, the second step of the envisioned
analysis involves an examination of the work to see if the design ele-
ments are functionally required. "If the design elements are not func-
tionally required, the work is protectable without regard to physical or
conceptual separability."48 This second step realizes the unique and
inherent functional nature of architectural works and makes copy-
right protection a little harder to get for such works.
In determining copyrightability of architectural works, courts
should apply only the basic test for originality.49 The second step sug-
45. Hellmuth, Obsolescence Ab Initio: The New Act and Architectural Copyright, 22
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y, 169, 173-74 (1975); Wargo, supra note 15, at 438 and 472.
Larsen, supra note 44, at 164-65 (Larsen, however, does point to Great Britain's
system as being overinclusive. British cases have protected blueprints of a lava-
tory pan connector, automobile exhaust pipes and plastic drawer systems. Larsen
opines that "careful wording of United States copyright law so as not to protect
designs dictated solely by function could avoid the problem of overinclusive-
ness.")
But see Comment, Reinforcing the Foundation: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Works of Architecture, 39 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1288 (1990)(authored
by James Bingham Bucher)[hereinafter Comment]. In his comment, Bucher
writes:
If Congress applies the ordinary copyright standard of originality, then
every building created free from the influence of other architects would
be copyrightable. However, many architects are both consciously and
subconsciously influenced by others. Thus, it would be nearly impossible
to determine which architectural works are truly original and hence
copyrightable.
46. Wargo, supra note 15, at 438.
47. H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 20.
48. Ik at 21.
49. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103-02 (2d Cir. 1951).
The Alfred Bell court held:
It is clear, then, that nothing in the Constitution commands that copy-
righted matter be strikingly unique or novel... All that is needed to
satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the 'author' contrib-
uted something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recog-
nizably 'his own.' Originality in this context 'means little more than a
prohibition of actual copying.' No matter how poor artistically the 'au-
thor's' addition, it is enough if it be his own.
[Vol. 70:873
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gested by the Judiciary Committee creates confusion which creation of
the new subject matter category should avoid. If the design elements
were functionally required, then the work would slip from protection
as an architectural work.50 Instead, it would have to seek cover under
the ambit of protection afforded pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works. As such, the useful article separability test would be applied.
And we would be back where we started before the Architectural
Works Act.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SCOPE OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN
ARCHITECTURAL WORKS
Perhaps the leading argument of proponents and instigators of new
legislation protecting architettural works was the need to protect the
three-dimensional products of architectural planning.51 A brief
sketch of case law prior to the passage of the Architectural Works Act
will be helpful in understanding this argument and its incorporation
into the Act. First, the protection of architectural plans must be ex-
amined. The next inquiry will focus on the protection of the right to
build from those plans. Finally, protection of completed buildings will
be studied.
For the most part, architectural plans, as well as other works like
blueprints and models, were adequately protected by copyright law
prior to passage of the Architectural Works Act. Architectural plans
are expressly included in the definition of pictorial, graphic and sculp-
tural works.52 The courts consistently have affirmed protection of ar-
chitectural plans against infringement.5 3
See also 1 M. NmumnER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.011] (1990); Robert R. Jones
Assocs., Inc., v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 278 (6th Cir. 1988); Demetriades v.
Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
50. It is difficult to imagine a building that comprises design elements that are not
functionally required. Some or many or most or all elements may be functionally
required. Even if all elements are functionally required, their combination and
configuration may be original and would therefore justify protection. See Note,
Standing on Shaky Ground Copyright Protection for Works of Architecture, 6
ART & L. 70, 71 (1981)(authored by Erika White) [hereinafter White].
51. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. See also Copyright Report, supra
note 4, at 221-22; Shipley, supra note 30,410; Brainard, supra note 35, at 96; Letter
from Christopher A. Meyer, on behalf of the American Institute of Architects
(AIA), to Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights (Sept. 16, 1988), at 7 [hereinafter
AIA Letter](responding to Notice of Inquiry), reprinted in Copyright Report,
supra note 4, at app. C; Comments of Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation to the U.S.
Copyright Office Notice of Inquiry on Architectural Work Protection, at 11-12
[hereinafter Wright Letter], reprinted in Copyright Report, supra note 4, at app.
C; Comment, supra note 45, at 1290.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1989).
53. See Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252,
261 (D. Neb. 1982); Herman Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051,1053 (E.D.
1991]
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The protection of the right to build from architectural plans---also
known as the execution right-remained the subject of debate at the
time the Architectural Works Act was enacted. Most courts have held
that an owner of copyright in architectural plans cannot prevent
others from building according to the plans.54 Some commentators
and courts have suggested that a structure is not a "copy" of its plans,
and therefore building from a copyrighted plan is not copying or in-
fringement.55 Most courts, in denying protection, have focused on the
nature of buildings as useful articles.56 Recently, however, a court sig-
nificantly expanded copyright protection of architectural works and
proscribed the use of infringing plans to construct a building.
In Robert R. Jones Associates v. Nino Homes,57 the plaintiff was a
custom home builder who distributed to potential buyers brochures
that contained abridged floor plans of one of the plaintiff's custom-
designed houses. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant copied these
plans and subsequently constructed seven houses that were substan-
tially similar to the plans. The evidence clearly showed that the de-
fendant had "copied" the plaintiff's plans and infringement was easily
established. In the course of determining appropriate damages, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that "one may construct a house
which is identical to a house depicted in copyrighted architectural
plans, but one may not directly copy those plans and then use the in-
fringing copy to construct the house."58
The court concluded that recoverable damages included the losses
suffered as a result of the defendant's use of the infringing copies-the
construction of the seven houses. While Nino Homes marks one cir-
cuit's movement toward extending copyright protection to the execu-
Mich. 1973) (a person should be able to prevent another from copying copyrighted
house plans and using them to build a house).
54. See Demetriades v. Kaufman, 680 F. Supp. 658, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)("construction
of a building imitating that depicted in copyrighted architectural plans does not,
consistent with Baker [v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)], constitute infringement of
those plans)]"; Herman Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. at 1053; Scholz
Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84, 85 (6th Cir. 1967); Imperial Homes Corp. v.
Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972); DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F.
Supp. 184, 196 (M.D. Fla. 1962); Schuchart & Assoc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F.
Supp. 928, 948 (W.D. Tex. 1982).
55. See Shipley, supra note 30, at 403.
56. See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. at 664. The Demetriades court
reasoned:
[A]lthough an owner of copyrighted architectural plans is granted the
right to prevent the unauthorized copying of those plans, that individual,
without benefit of a design patent, does not obtain a protectable interest
in the useful article (the building) depicted by those plans.
See also Scholz Homes Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d at 85; Imperial Homes Corp. v.
Lamont, 458 F.2d at 899.
57. Robert R. Jones Assoc. Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1988).
58. Id- at 280 (emphasis added).
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tion right, no other circuit's have followed suit. Thus, the protection
of the right to build remained limited prior to the passage of the Ar-
chitectural Works Act.
Protection of the completed building was for all practical purposes
nonexistent. As useful articles, most buildings were subjected to and
failed the separability test.59 Under the 1976 Act and common law
copyright law, the only structures passing the test were monuments 60
and perhaps buildings embellished with decorative ornaments-such
as gargoyles and stained glass windows6 l-and very aesthetically and
artistically unique buildings like the Guggenheim Museum. The list
of protected buildings was short at best. No court proscribed copy-
ing-either in drawing plans or constructing-of a non-monumental
building. The Nino Homes court, for instance, expressly rejected the
idea of preventing copying of the building itself.
The lack of protection for the right to build and of the buildings
themselves drew considerable criticism62 and is perhaps the primary
reason for the Architectural Works Act.63 Critics focused on the sig-
nificance of the right to build as forming the essential economic value
of architectural planning.64 Absent a right to build and to prevent in-
59. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The House Report on the Copyright
Act of 1976 hinted that the separability test would exclude most architectural
works other than plans, drawings and the like:
[Tihe extent to which [copyright] protection would extend to the struc-
ture depicted would depend on the circumstances. Purely non-func-
tional or monumental structures would be subject to full copyright
protection under the bill, and the same would be true of artistic sculp-
ture or decorative ornamentation or embellishment added to the struc-
ture. On the other hand, where the only elements of shape in an
architectural design are conceptually inseparable from the utilitarian as-
pects of the structure, copyright protection for the design would not be
available.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976).
60. Id- See Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1936)(me-
morial entitled to copyright because it was an object of art as well as an article of
manufacture).
One court, on the other hand, even determined that a monumental work was
functional. See Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition, Inc., 555 F. Supp.
154, 156 (E.D. Tenn. 1983)("economic and engineering considerations dictated the
height and structural steel design of the Sunsphere Tower").
61. Shipley, supra note 30, at 427 n.184.
62. Robert R. Jones Assoc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 280 n.5 (6th Cir. 1988)(the
same result would not necessarily obtain if the alleged infringer merely made
houses which were substantially similar to the house depicted in the copyrighted
plans).
63. See supra note 51.
64. Id- See also Larsen, supra note 44, at 152 ("Architects may have no incentive to
expend the considerable time and effort necessary to create an original design if,
once constructed, others may freely exploit that design."). Cf. Comment, supra
note 45, at 1267-71 (discussing the significance of the market as an incentive
mechanism for creating architectural design).
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fringing construction, the effectiveness of copyright protection of ar-
chitectural works was sharply diminished. Professor Shipley wrote
that "[b]ecause the value of architectural plans depends in part on con-
trol over the right to build, [protection of plans but not buildings] ren-
ders copyright protection almost meaningless unless the architect can
mass market his blueprints." 65 Another commentator thoughtfully
stated, "[ilt is ironic that the absence of economic incentives which
would otherwise result from protection undoubtedly concerns the
many architects designing residential and commercial structures more
than the few who are commissioned to design monuments or other
essentially nonfunctional works."66
The Architectural Works Act retrieves architectural works from
the definition of useful articles6 7 and puts an end to the argument that
a completed structure is not a "copy."68 The Act, however, provides
little guidance as to the scope of the copyright owner's exclusive rights
in her architectural works. What guidance the Act provides comes in
the shape of limitations on the exclusive rights.69 But before discuss-
ing these limitations, examination of the exclusive rights that should
exist, and likely will exist, is in order.
First, the right to reproduce the copyrighted architectural works.70
This right forms perhaps the most significant protection for owners of
copyright in architectural works. With respect to architectural works,
there are four types of reproduction: (1) copying of plans in the form
of other plans;71 (2) copying a building in the form of another build-
ing, when construction is based on only visual inspection of the copied
building; (3) copying plans in the form of a building-execution; and
(4) copying a building in the form of plans, when the plans are made
based on only visual inspection of the copied building.72
The first type of reproduction-copying plans from other plans-as
demonstrated above, was adequately protected before passage of the
Architectural Works Act.73 Under the Act, there will be little, if any
65. Shipley, supra note 30, at 410.
66. Brainard, supra note 35, at 98.
67. See H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 20. The report states:
[b]y creating a new category of protectible [sic] subject matter .... and,
therefore, by deliberately not emcompassing architectural works as pic-
torial, graphic, or sculptural works .. , the copyrightability of architec-
tural works shall not be evaluated under the separability test applicable
to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works embodied in useful articles.
68. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
69. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 7, 104
Stat. 5133 § 704 (1990). See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)(1989).
71. Throughout the remainder of this section, "plans" include plans, sketches, draw-
ings, renderings, models and the like.
72. See Wargo, supra note 15, at 427 n.133, and 441.
73. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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change in the protection of this reproduction right.
The second type of reproduction-copying a building from another
building-was never protected, with exception once made for ceme-
tery memorials.74 This type of reproduction, where the copy is based
only upon inspection of the original building itself and not upon any
plans, is also referred to as "reverse engineering." 75 Under the Archi-
tectural Works Act, this type of reproduction should be protected. In
other words, copying of a building, when the copying is not authorized
by the copyright owner, will constitute infringement.
Courts may not be receptive to this idea, but the new law as writ-
ten provides little ground for arguing that this right of reproduction
should not be protected like any other right of reproduction. In fact,
this right may need the most protection. Access to a building-the
interior and especially the exterior-to observe and inspect the floor
plan arrangement and the configuration of design elements seems far
more easily obtained than obtaining access to the plans themselves.
Reverse engineering itself may be the easiest form of reproduction.
While copying of the building may not be precise, there is no reason to
doubt that it could be substantially similar. Thus, the second type of
reproduction should find protection under the Architectural Works
Act.
The third type of reproduction right-copying (executing) plans in
the form of a building-is the type of right the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Nino Homes moved toward protecting.76 While, before
passage of the Architectural Works Act, no other circuits followed the
lead of Nino Homes, there is no reason for any reluctance now. The
arguments that buildings are useful articles and are not "copies" of
plans has been precluded by the definitional section of the Act.77
Finally, the fourth type of reproduction-making plans based only
upon visual inspection of the building-was never before an issue.
The right to this type of reproduction probably did not exist for the
same reason the reverse engineering right was not protected.78 Under
the Architectural Works Act, the right to this type of reproduction
74. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Before passage of the Architectural
Works Act, copying of buildings was not an infringement because the architec-
tural design as embodied in the building was unprotected.
75. Larsen, supra note 44, at 151 n.5.
76. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Even Nino Homes did not protect ab-
solutely the execution right. Execution was only protected if the plans were cop-
ied in the form of other plans and then executed.
77. See supra notes 54-55 and 67-68 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. Because the architectural design in
the building was unprotected, unauthorized copying of this design-as long as




should also be protected because buildings themselves are protected.79
Beyond the exclusive right of reproduction, the owner of copyright
in architectural works will also enjoy exclusive rights to prepare de-
rivative works, to distribute copies of the work and to display the work
publicly.8 0 These rights, however, will be significantly limited by two
provisions of the Architectural Works Act. Analysis and discussion of
these provisions is appropriate and necessary at this point.
The first limitation states:
The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not
include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pic-
tures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if
the building in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible
from a public place.8 1
This limiting provision is unambiguous and its concept was popu-
larly supported prior to passage of the Architectural Works Act by
respondents to an inquiry by the Register of Copyrights.82 The limita-
tion helps achieve a balancing of the interests involved and inherent in
architectural works. As a whole, the Architectural Works Act recog-
nizes and significantly enhances the interests of the architect as the
copyright owner. The pictorial representation limitation protects the
interests of the public and of other architects. The public still will be
able to photograph buildings and houses that catch their eyes on a
Sunday drive. Movie directors won't feel inhibited in filming scenes in
neighborhoods where protected houses stand. Architects will not be
denied the opportunity to sketch or photograph buildings so that they
may borrow design elements and ideas.83 Obviously, such uses might
infringe upon the copyright owner's rights of display and distribution,
absent the limitation.8 4
79. While unauthorized reproduction in the form of detailed plans or blueprints
should be prohibited, less detailed pictorial representations of the building should
not and cannot be prohibited. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2),(3) and (4)(1989).
81. Architectual Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title 7,
§ 704(a), 104 Stat. 5133 (1990)(adding section 120(a) to title 17, United States
Code).
82. See generally Copyright Report, supra note 4, at apps. B and C. See, e.g., AIA
Letter, supra note 51, at 8-9.
83. But see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
84. For example, the Copyright Act of 1976 definition of "display" includes showing a
copy of the work by means of a film. To "display publicly" means to do so in a
place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of people,
other than family and friends, is gathered. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1989). The picto-
rial representation limitation assures that a movie that displayed a home, which
embodied a protected design, would not constitute an infringement.
Of course, the fair use exception would likely protect the movie absent the
new provision. In that vein, the new provision acts as another express fair use-
type limitation. See H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 21-22. ("Given the im-
portant public purpose served by these uses and the lack of harm to the copyright
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The second limiting provision states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(2) (the right to prepare deriva-
tive works), the owners of a building embodying an architectural work may,
without the consent of the author or copyright owner of the architectural
work, make or authorize the making of alterations to such building, and de-
stroy or authorize the destruction of such building.8 5
This provision clearly expresses that the copyright owner's right to
prepare derivative works cannot be imposed to prevent the building
owner from destroying the building or making additions and altera-
tions to the building-whether they be necessary for construction or
just to suit the building owner's desires. It also seems to preclude rec-
ognition of the author's moral rights-if any exist-in the building.86
Like the pictorial representations limitation, the second limitation
helps maintain a balance of interest. As mentioned, the Architectural
Works Act enhances the protection provided for the architect's rights
and interest. For instance, one such right is the authority to seek in-
junctive relief to prevent infringement.8 7 The alterations and destruc-
tion limitation counterbalances the copyright owner's injunctive relief
authority by giving the building owner flexibility in deciding what to
add to or subtract from his building.SS The limitation, in other words,
strikes a balance between the property interests of the building owner
and the intellectual property interests of the copyright owner.
The limitation on the copyright owner's derivative works rights
seems to comport with the attitude of most commentators, who gener-
ally agreed that the author of the work should not be allowed to in-
voke moral rights to prevent alteration or destruction.8 9 The
commentators suggested that, absent new moral rights protection, if
the architect wished to limit the building owner's right to alter or de-
stroy, then such limitations should prudently be provided for by con-
owner's market, the Committee chose to provide an exception, rather than rely
on the doctrine of fair use...")
Furthermore, the express language of the new provision indicates limitation
of the public display and distribution rights. See supra note 81 and accompanying
text.
85. Architectual Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 7, § 704(a),
104 Stat. 5133 (1990)(adding § 120(b) to title 17, United States Code.
86. But see infra note 117 and accompanying text.
87. For example, to enjoin construction according to infringing plans or to have a
structure demolished. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
88. See H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 14.
89. See Letter from Professor David E. Shipley to Library of Congress, Copyright
Office (Sept. 10, 1988), at 3 [hereinafter Shipley Letter](responding to Notice of
Inquiry), reprinted in Copyright Report, supra note 4, at app. C ("Absent recog-
nition of moral rights in the United States, the owner of intellectual property
rights in an architectural work who conveys all of those rights to another should
not have the right to prohibit alterations to the work.") See also Quatman Letter,
supra note 39, at 14; AIA Letter, supra note 51, at 8; Wright Letter, supra note 51,
at 6; Wargo, supra note 15, at 476.
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tract.90 Professor Shipley was the only respondent to the Notice of
Inquiry who mentioned that the architect's right to prevent altera-
tions might be available by retaining the right to prepare derivative
works.9 1 The new provision foreclosed that possibility.
In sum, the alterations and destruction limitation precludes the ar-
chitect's right to prevent creation of derivative works which are uses
of the original building. On the other hand, the limitation does not
preclude the right to prevent preparation of derivative works which
are other buildings based on the original building.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE VISUAL ARTISTS ACT ON
ARCHITECTURAL WORKS
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,92 which creates a new sub-
ject matter category entitled "works of visual art," was passed in con-
junction with the Architectural Works Act.93 The Visual Artists Act
creates moral rights of attribution and integrity for the author of
works of visual art.94 Works of visual art include paintings, drawings,
90. See Shipley Letter. See also Quatman Letter, supra note 39, at 14; AIA Letter,
supra note 51, at 8; Wright Letter, supra note 51, at 6; Wargo, supra note 15, at
476.
91. Shipley letter, supra note 89, at 3.
92. The Architectural Works Act was passed in conjunction with the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit.6, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) which recog-
nizes the rights of "attribution" and "integrity" of visual artists. Both rights are
moral rights.
93. Both acts were part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, 104 Stat. 5089.
94. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit.6, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990)
Title 6, § 603. Section 603 amends the Copyright Act of 1976 by inserting after
section 106, section 1O6A, which in pertinent part provides:
(a) RIGHTS OF ATrRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY--Subject to section 107
and independent of the exclusive rights provided in section 106, the au-
thor of a work of visual art-
(1) shall have the right-
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work
of visual art which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the
author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation,
or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or
her honor or reputation; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shave have
the right-
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor
or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification
of that work is a violation of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and
any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a viola-
tion of that right.
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prints, sculptures and still photographic images.95 The works must
exist in single copies or in limited editions of 200 or fewer copies that
are signed or somehow identify the author and are consecutively num-
bered by the author.96 Works of visual art, on the other hand, do not
include works in four categories. 97
The first excluded category consists of posters, map globes, charts,
technical drawings, diagrams, models, applied art, motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, books, magazines, newspapers and other pe-
riodicals, databases, electronic information systems and electronic
publications. These are not considered works of visual art. The sec-
ond excluded category comprises merchandising items and advertising
promotional and descriptive materials, and covering and packaging
materials and containers. Third, works for hire are not included. And
finally, works not subject to copyright protection under title 17 of the
United States Code are excluded.98
The first question that arises regarding the interrelation between
the Visual Artists Act and the Architectural Works Act is whether the
newly created category of "works of visual art" encompasses the
newly created category of "architectural works." Are authors of ar-
chitectural works granted the rights of integrity and attribution pro-
vided by the Visual Artists Act? From the definitional language of the
Visual Artists Act, the answer is not certain. "Architectural works"
are not expressly included under the definition of visual art works.
But "architectural works" are not expressly excluded from the defini-
tion either. Because of the new subject matter category created under
the Architectural Works Act, architectural works are not encom-
passed by the broad fourth exclusion--of works not subject to copy-
right protection under title 17.99
With regard to architectural design as embodied in plans, render-
ings, models and the like, the Visual Artists Act should be read not to
include such works. The definition excludes models and technical
drawings.OO Under the current definition of pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works, "technical drawings" are said to include "architec-
tural plans."io' Therefore, as technical drawings, architectural plans,
as well as blueprints, sketches and similar two-dimensional architec-
tural drawings, should not and undoubtedly will not be considered
95. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 6, § 602, 104 Stat. § 128
(1990)(amending 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1989) by including the definition for "works of
visual art" after the definition for "widow.")
96. I&
97. I&
98. See H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1990).
99. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 6, § 602, 104 Stat.
§ 128 (1990).
100. id
101. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1989).
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works of visual art. Additionally, the models excluded by the Visual
Artists Act surely encompass architectural models.
With regard to architectural designs embodied in buildings, the an-
swer as to whether they are works of visual art is perhaps less clear.
No included work appears to encompass buildings. And unless a
building was created as a work for hire, the only other type of work
excluded by the Visual Artists Act that seems to encompass buildings
is "applied art." By their nature and their treatment before passage of
the Architectural Works Act, it would seem buildings are works of
applied art. 0 2 But, as demonstrated above, architectural works were
deliberately removed from the subject matter category under which
applied art is found. 0 3 Nonetheless, it is most likely that buildings
will not be considered works of visual art.104 Nor should most build-
ings be protectable as works of visual art.105 Exception, however,
should be made for buildings which pass the separability test applied
to useful articles.106 As evidenced by the current law, few buildings
will pass this muster. Only monuments and buildings like the Gug-
genheim Museum might qualify for protection as works of visual
art.107 Embellishment with decorative ornamentation, on the other
hand, should not qualify a building itself as a visual arts work.108
Section 604 of the Visual Artists Act makes provisions for authors'
102. Herman Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. at 1053; Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Mad-
dox, 379 F.2d 84, 85 (6th Cir. 1967); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895,
899 (5th Cir. 1972); DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 196 (M.D.
Fla- 1962); Schuchart & Assoc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 948 (W.D.
Tex. 1982).
103. See supra note 67.
104. Therefore, buildings will not qualify for moral rights protection under the Visual
Artists Act. Commentators supporting the concept behind the Architectural
Works Act were divided on the issue as to whether architects should be granted
moral rights protection. Compare Quatman Letter, supra note 39, at 14; and AIA
Letter, supra note 51, at 8 ("AIA believes that moral rights are essentially unnec-
essary with respect to works related to architecture .. "), with Shipley letter,
supra note 89, at 3, and Wright Letter, supra note 51, at 9 ("[R]emedies should be
permitted for mutilation or other alterations which could come within the mean-
ing of moral rights under the Berne Convention.").
105. Architect's moral rights should yield to real property rights in order to lessen
economic waste that may result because of the enforcement of moral rights.
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5)(1989); supra notes 36 and 59 and accompanying text.
107. 1& See Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1936)(me-
morial entitled to copyright because it was an object of art as well as an article of
manufacture).
One court, on the other hand, even determined that a monumental work was
functional. See Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition, Inc., 555 F. Supp.
154, 156 (E.D. Tenn. 1983)("economic and engineering considerations dictated the
height and structural steel design of the Sunsphere tower").
108. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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rights in works of visual art incorporated in buildings.10 9 The provi-
sions basically limit the integrity and attribution rights otherwise cre-
ated by the Visual Artists Acti10 when the work of visual art is part of
a building. Arguably, if Congress had intended buildings to be in-
cluded in the definition of visual art works, it would not have made
special provisions for visual art works incorporated in buildings.
Section 604 of the Visual Artists Act is, however, an important pro-
vision for architects and building owners and should not be passed
over without serious examination. The section amends 17 U.S.C. § 113
by adding a subsection (d)(1), which states:
In a case in which-
(A) a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made part of a building in
such a way that removing the work from the building will cause the destruc-
tion, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the works as described in
section 106(a)(3),1 13 and (B) the author consented to the installation of the
work in the building either before the effective date set forth in section 9(a) of
the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,112 or in a written instrument executed
on or after such effective date that is signed by the owner of the building and
the author and that specifies that installation of the work may subject the
work to destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification, by reason of
its removal, then the rights conferred by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
106A(a) 11 3 shall not apply.1 1 4
Essentially, what this section provides is that if a visual art work
was incorporated in a building before June 1, 1991, with the author's
consent, or after June 1, 1991, if the author similarly consented in a
signed written agreement that says the work's installation may subject
it to harm if it is removed, then the author's integrity right in the
work is relinquished and attribution right is substantially diminished.
The difficulty here is determining what effects this section and the
alterations and destruction provision of the Architectural Works
109. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 6, § 604, 104 Stat. § 128,
5130 (1990).
110. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 6, § 603, 104 Stat. § 128,
(1990). See supra note 94. The extent to which the integrity and attribution
rights may be limited will not be examined in this Comment.
111. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 6, § 603, 104 Stat. § 128,
(1990). See supra note 94.
112. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 6, § 610(a), 104 Stat.
§ 128,5132 (1990) ("[Tlhis title and the amendments made by this title take effect
6 months after the date of the enactment of the Act."). Since President Bush
signed the Act on Dec. 1, 1990, it will take effect June 1, 1991.
113. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 6, § 603, 104 Stat. § 128,
(1990), supra note 94.
114. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 6, § 604, 104 Stat. § 128,
5130 (1990). The section proceeds to explain how the building owner can go about
removing the visual art work from his building if it can be done without destroy-
ing, distorting, mutilating or otherwise damaging the visual art work.
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Actll5 will have upon one another.
Section 604 of the Visual Artists Act may work to limit the build-
ing owner's right to destroy or alter her building. Suppose, for in-
stance, that the architect creates an overall design that both interiorly
and exteriorly incorporates several separable works of visual art. Per-
haps the building is a church and some of the separable features are a
large stained glass window, bas-relief bronze doors, gargoyles and a
mural spanning the length and height of an entire wall.116 Also sup-
pose that the features were designed by the architect and cannot be
removed without destroying, distorting, mutilating or otherwise dam-
aging the features. Section 604 would then allow the architect effec-
tively to prevent the building owner from altering-by removing the
features--or destroying the building, providing the architect did not
consent to permitting damage to the features.
Before passage of the two new acts just discussed, a building could
be protected by copyright only if it was sufficiently embellished with
decorative ornamentation."17 After passage of the acts, embellish-
ment is not the key to copyrightability, but it is a necessary element
for moral rights protection that may effectively and consequently pro-
tect the building itself. The architect of an embellished building may
in effect have moral rights protection. The architect of an unembel-
lished building will not.
VI. INFRINGEMENT
To establish infringement of copyright in architectural works, the
test should be the substantial similarity test traditionally applied in
most copyright infringement cases.11 8 The plaintiff should be re-
quired to prove the defendant "copied" the plaintiff's copyrighted
work."19 To prove the defendant copied the work, the plaintiff should
115. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 7, 104
Stat. 5133 § 704 (1990), supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
116. The features are not applied art because architectural works can no longer be
classified as "useful articles." See supra note 67. Instead, the features are simply
works of visual art which are part of the architectural work.
Another hypothetical might involve a building which is a monument or a
building like the Guggenheim Museum, either of which itself might be a work of
visual art. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
118. The Judiciary Committee and most commentators urged that the ordinary-non-
heightened-substantial similarity test should be applied to determine infringe-
ment of architectural works. H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 21; Shipley,
supra note 30, at 446; Larsen, supra note 44, at 172; AIA Letter, supra note 51, at
5; Wright Letter, supra note 51, at 4; Quatman Letter, supra note 39, at 13.
119. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Walker v. Time Life
Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986);
Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co. Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981).
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have to show the defendant had access' 2 0 to the copyrighted work and
that the defendant's work was substantially similar to the
plaintiff's.'2 1
The substantial similarity test, before passage of the Architectural
Works Act, was applied to determine infringement by reproduction of
copyrighted architectural plans, drawings, models and the like.12 2
Under the Architectural Works Act, the same test should be applied
to determine when the defendant's plans infringe the plaintiff's plans.
Applying such a test would be no more difficult than usual.
Courts have also shown an inclination toward applying the same
infringement standard to cases in which the defendant used copy-
righted plans to construct a building. 2 3 Absent copying or use of
plans, however, courts have not held any duplication of a building to
constitute infringement.'2 4 Thus, no standard has been developed for
determining infringement when a building is copied.
The substantial similarity test should be applied to determine
whether copying of a building has occurred. First, the defendant must
have had access to the building. Simply viewing a building and walk-
ing through it should be enough to constitute access.'2 5 To examine
the similarity between the plaintiff's and the defendant's building, the
factfinder should study the overall similarity between the two struc-
tures.126 Buildings sharing similar concepts or ideas should not give
rise to infringement.12 7 For clear example, if evidence in a case shows
only that the plaintiff and defendant each had a three-story apartment
complex composed of single resident units, each containing a bedroom,
bathroom, kitchen, dining area and living room, then there would be
insufficient grounds upon which to find infringement. If, however, ev-
idence further revealed that the rooms in each unit of both complexes
were arranged similarly, if doors and windows were located in similar
places, if other design elements were similarly arranged, if the uses of
space were similar, and if these similarities were substantial, then a
120. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
121. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936);
Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co. Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981).
122. Herman Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1054 (E.D. Mich. 1973);
Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84, 86-87 (6th Cir. 1967)(dictum).
123. Robert R. Jones Assoc., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 276-77 (6th Cir. 1988).
124. Exception being made, of course, for monuments. Id See Jones Bros. Co. v. Un-
derkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1936)(memorial entitled to copyright
because it was an object of art as well as an article of manufacture).
One court, on the other hand, even determined that a monumental work was
functional. See Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition, Inc., 555 F. Supp.
154, 156 (E.D. Tenn. 1983)("economic and engineering considerations dictated the
height and structural steel design of the Sunsphere tower").
125. Shipley Letter, supra note 89, at 3.
126. See Larsen, supra note 44, at 172.
127. See Shipley, supra note 30, at 446.
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valid infringement claim might well exist.128
In sum, substantial similarity should be a measure of the overall
form and overall configuration, arrangement and composition of
spaces, rooms and other design elements.129 Such a standard comports
with both the language of the statute and the intentions of the com-
mittee which considered the legislation that eventually became the
Architectural Works Act.130
Some commentators have suggested that the "total concept and
feel" test'3 ' should be applied to determine infringement of architec-
tural works.132 The total concept and feel test, however, is not appro-
priate for determining infringement of architectural works. To the
extent that it moves away from a study of the configuration and com-
position of elements and details, the concept and feel test is too nebu-
lous a standard to apply to buildings in light of the importance of
buildings' utilitarian nature and the importance of borrowing in archi-
tecture. The utilitarian nature of the subject matter makes the nor-
mal approach to infringement inappropriate. It is not, as mentioned
above, the total concept of a building, but rather the overall form and
configuration of all its parts that stands protected.133 For example, two
two-bedroom homes with pitched roofs, to the ordinary observer,
might have the same total concept and feel. Without knowing more
about the homes-about the arrangement of their windows, doors and
other elements-a finding of infringement would allow architects to
monopolize unprotectable concepts and ideas and the functional as-
pects of their structures. 3 4 Requiring a showing of substantial simi-
larity in the overall configuration and composition of elements and
space, on the other hand, would adequately prevent such monopoliza-
tion and consequent stifling of creativity in and necessary borrowing
of architectural design.135
Requiring a showing of substantial similarity in the overall config-
uration and composition of elements and space, however, is not to sug-
gest that the determination would be beyond the capacity of an
128. Id at 447.
129. See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976)("the essence of the infringement lies in taking not a
general theme but its particular expression through similarities of treatment, de-
tails, scenes, events and characterization.")
The traditional idea/expression dichotomy is thus maintained with the pres-
ent application of the substantial similarity text to the architectural works.
130. H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 21.
131. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977).
132. Larsen, supra note 44, at 172; AIA Letter, supra note 51, at 6; Wright Letter,
supra note 51, at 5; Quatman Letter, supra note 39, at 13.
133. AIA Letter, supra note 51, at 6. See also Shipley, supra note 30, at 446.




ordinary observer.136 The decision would not necessarily depend on
external criteria and expert analysis. 3 7 Rather, an ordinary reason-
able observer could consider the overall form of and configuration of
elements and space in the plaintiff's and defendant's buildings-and
plans--and determine whether substantial similarity exists. Addition-
ally, whether substantial similarity and infringement occurred should
be a jury question. 3 8
VII. REMEDIES
Crafting appropriate remedies for infringement of copyrighted ar-
chitectural works undoubtedly will be no simple task, especially when
a structure is involved. Again, the architect's interest in intellectual
property clashes against the public's interests and the building
owner's interest in tangible property.
If plans, without authorization, are reproduced only in the form of
other plans, then injunctive relief should be available as it is with any
other copyrighted subject matter. 3 9 The plaintiff should be able to
have the copied plans destroyed or delivered back to the plaintiff.14o
These remedies would stop the infringement before it created a sub-
stantial economic harm to the plaintiff-before construction of the
building had begun. The same could be accomplished by enjoining the
defendants from initiating construction of the building embodying the
copied design.141 Enjoining the initiation of construction would also
be an appropriate preliminary relief while awaiting a ruling on
whether the plans to be used for construction actually infringed the
copyrighted plans as alleged.142 Damages should also be an available
remedy when architectural plans are copied.143
Once construction has begun, determining the appropriate remedy
136. Larsen, supra note 44, at 172; Quatman Letter, supra note 39, at 13; Herman
Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
137. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
138. Larsen, supra note 44, at 172.
139. See Wargo, supra note 15, at 437. See also 3 M. NmImER, NMMIER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 14.06 (1990). Injunctive relief for copyright infringement is authorized by 17
U.S.C. § 502 (1989).
140. See Wargo, supra note 15, at 437.
141. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See also Her-
man Frankel Org. v. Wolfe, 184 U.S. P.Q. 819, 821 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
142. See Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir.
1977) ("In copyright cases .... if probable success-a prima facie case of copyright
infringement-can be shown, the allegations of irreparable injury need not be
very detailed, because such injury can normally be presumed when a copyright is
infringed.") See also Wolfe, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 821.
143. See Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252,
262-68 (D. Neb. 1982)(damages for infringing copying of plans consisted of actual
damages-the fair market value of the plans--and the infringer's profits).
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is much more complex. Destruction should be available only when it
will not cause unreasonable economic waste.' 44 For instance, it is hard
to imagine and foresee a case in which a court would order destruction
of a completed house.145 In such a case the economic waste and harm
to the probably innocent building owners would be unreasonable.146
Where economic waste would be significantly less, destruction might
be a more plausible option. For instance, destruction might be appro-
priate and reasonable in the case of a home of which only one wall has
been raised or of a completed pergola.147
Enjoining construction which was already underway would be a
less severe remedy than destruction only if noninfringing construction
to finish the work was possible. In such a case, modifications in what
had been completed prior to injunction might be necessary to assure
that the finished structure would not be substantially similar to the
copyrighted structure.1 48
Where either destruction or enjoined construction would result in
unreasonable economic waste, the courts could and should craft an ap-
propriate award of damages for the infringement.149 Appropriate
damages would include the architect's fees,150 other profits the archi-
tect would have enjoyed absent duplication of her design,15' as well as
attorneys fees and court costs.'5 2
VIII. PREEMPTION AND EFFECTIVE DATE
Under the Architectural Works Act, state and local laws, which
relate to architectural works will be preempted like those relating to
144. Wargo, supra note 12, at 477. Destruction remedy authorized by 17 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(1989).
145. But see AIA Letter, supra note 51, at 7. The AIA was the only respondent to the
Register of Copyrights' Notice of Inquiry on architectural works that suggested
destruction of a completed structure as a plausible remedy. The AIA added, how-
ever, that courts likely would use their discretion and consider the economic
waste involved in fashioning such a remedy.
146. Hellmuth, supra note 45, at 194 ("It would be extremely wasteful and uncon-
scionable in an era of scarcity of natural resources to allow vindictive plaintiffs to
destroy any substantial edifice because of copyright infringement.").
147. See supra note 12.
148. Shipley Letter, supra note 89, at 3; Wright Letter, supra note 51, at 5.
149. See Quatman Letter, supra note 39, at 14. See also Shipley Letter, supra note 89,
at 3.
Damages and profits remedy authorized by 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1989).
150. Shipley Letter, supra note 89, at 3 (damages should include the fee or commission
the architect would have made if she had designed the structure in question).
151. Robert R. Jones Assoc. Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 281 (6th Cir.
1988)("[T]he measure of damages in this case is the profits Jones Associates
would have made on houses it would have sold but for Nino Homes' unauthorized
duplication of the Aspen plans and Nino Homes' use of its infringing copies to
build its Riverside houses.").
152. See Quatman Letter, supra note 39, at 14.
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any other work with one significant exception. Section 705 of the Act,
however, provides that "[s]tate and local landmarks, historic preserva-
tion, zoning, or building codes, relating to architectural works.. ." will
not be preempted.153 This provision is plain and practically sound and
will not likely be subject to significant confusion.
The Architectural Works Act applies to and protects original archi-
tectural works, whether embodied in buildings, models, plans, draw-
ings, or the like, that were created on or after December 1, 1990-the
enactment date of the Act.15 4 The Act also protects any architectural
work embodied in an unpublished plan or drawing before December 1,
1990, but not yet constructed as of that date.155 This latter protection,
however, will terminate on December 31, 2002, unless the work has
been constructed by then. 5 6
With respect to the effective date of the Architectural Works Act,
some issues are likely to arise. First, what if infringing construction
according to copyrighted but unpublished and unconstructed plans
had already begun prior to December 1, 1990? Would the original plan
be protected from additional construction? The answer should depend
on the amount of construction of substantially similar work that had
occurred prior to the enactment date. If the building was complete
enough to be substantially similar to the original plans, then the case
must fall back to the law prior to the Architectural Works Act to de-
termine infringement and to preclude problems with retroactivity. In-
fringement in such a case would be of the plans, not as "architectural
works," but rather as "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works." 5 7 If,
before the enactment date, the construction was not to a stage where
what had been completed could be found substantially similar to the
original plans, then the Architectural Works Act would apply. There-
fore, further construction, which would render the building substan-
tially similar to the original plans, would be infringement under the
new Act.
Along a similar line, there arises an issue as to the amount of con-
struction by the copyright owner-according to pre-enactment date
plans-that must have occurred before December 31, 2002, in order to
153. Architecture Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 7, § 705,
104 Stat. 5133, 5134 (1990)(amending title 17, § 301(b)).
154. Architecture Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 7, § 706(1),
104 Stat. 5133, 5134 (1990).
155. Architecture Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. 7, § 706(2),
104 Stat. 5133, 5134 (1990).
156. Id
157. See, e.g., Robert R. Jones Assoc. Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 281 (6th Cir.
1988). Under the law prior to the copies used to construct, then a court might
find infringement under Nino Homes. If the plans were not copied, then a future
court would have to stretch the Nino Homes rule to find infringing construction
according to the original plans.
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salvage protection under the Architectural Works Act. The solution
to this issue should rest simply on whether construction has begun.
The Judiciary Committee created the twelve-year provisionary period
"[i]n order to encourage authors of architectural works to construct
their unpublished creations."158 By initiating construction, the author
has plainly expressed an intention to construct the building. To deny
protection to such an author would be to discourage construction.
IX. CONCLUSION
In determining copyrightability and infringement of works pro-
tected under the Architectural Works Act and in crafting appropriate
remedies, the courts must carefully balance the various interests at
stake. When a constructed building is involved, maintaining a stable
balance will demand enhanced delicacy. Three primary interests must
be considered. The first two are those traditionally considered in
copyright law-the interests of the architect, as the author, on one
hand, and the public, which includes architects who later will be bor-
rowing ideas, on the other. But into this traditional balance must also
be considered the significant interests of the tangible property owner,
the owner of the building. This is the interest that is concerned with
the "useful" aspect of buildings. By its provisions limiting the copy-
right owner's right to prevent pictorial representations, alteration and
destruction of the building, the Architectural Works Act itself takes
initial steps toward maintaining a balance. Courts must now follow
suit.
By extending protection to designs embodied in buildings, the Ar-
chitectural Works Act provides greater economic incentives to archi-
tects and grants architects protection comparable to that previously
afforded the creators of other artistic and sculptural works. Subject to
reasonable interpretation and application, the Act should protect orig-
inality and foster creativity without restraining competition or inter-
fering with the legitimate borrowing of architectural ideas and
concepts.
Additionally, the expanded protection that the Architectural
Works Act provides should even benefit the building owners if the
proper balance is maintained. For example, the owner of a custom-
designed home or commercial building will have its investment pro-
tected from mindless duplication. Both the financial and personal
value the owner has in the building will thus stand protected.
In summary, if interpreted and applied by the courts to maintain a
balance among the three interests-private intellectual property, pri-
158. H.R. REP. No. 735, supra note 12, at 24.
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vate tangible property and public-the Architectural Works Act will
create advantages for each.
Andrew S. Pollock '92
